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We are grateful for the opportunity to reply to the comments
by Hernán (1) and Brookhart (2) on our paper about incident
and prevalent exposures and causal inference, in which we
argued that limiting studies to persons who are followed from
ﬁrst exposure onward may damage epidemiology (3).
In an imaginary world, the ideal study would start from
ﬁrst exposure and follow all study participants until the end
of their lives. In the real world, the issue is not whether there
will be missing data for some time periods. There always will
be. Rather, the issue iswhich time periodswe should focus on.
The question is not whether “left truncation is okay” but
whether “left truncation or right censoring is a more serious
problem in this study of this hypothesis.” It is not a matter of
idealism versus pragmatism but which type of pragmatism is
most appropriate in a given situation. In a study of alcohol
consumption and car accidents, missing data on the 24 hours
after drinking (i.e., left truncation) would be disastrous. In a
study of occupational cancer, the ﬁrst 5 years after exposure
maynot be of interest, whereas data for the period ofmore than
10 years after ﬁrst exposure are crucial.
Hernán’s analogy that we are complacent about seat-belt
use because risks are small (1) is misleading. The issue is
not about wearing a seat belt but whether “not wearing a seat
belt” is the most serious problem. When taking an airplane,
would you rather 1) wear a seat belt during takeoff, 2) know
that the plane had enough fuel to reach its destination, or
3) know that the landing gear worked? The ideal trip has
all 3, and the ideal epidemiologic study has perfect and inﬁ-
nite follow-up. In the real world, however, we need to make
choices: We are almost always faced with accepting left trun-
cation, right censoring, or both, and the best decision depends
on the hypothesis under study.
Fundamentally, we disagreewhen Hernán sees the purpose
of epidemiologic research as speciﬁcally to support practice
and limits epidemiology to studies that resemble randomized
trials. We conduct epidemiologic studies for many reasons,
including to assess causality for factors that will not lead to
immediate interventions, that is, to explore etiology. Many
studies involve complex exposures (e.g., socioeconomic status,
climate change) that are relevant to public health policy but
do not correspond to a randomized trial, even in theory.
Hernán chooses to deﬁne epidemiology in a narrow way be-
cause this ﬁts the elegant (and often incredibly useful) ran-
domized trial-based theory that he advocates. This ultimately
means restricting epidemiology to studying the short- ormedium-
term effects of very speciﬁc interventions and not studying
many important public health problems (has there ever been
an incident-exposures study of smoking and lung cancer or of
a gene and cancer at middle age?). However much we admire
Brookhart’s ideas about the treatment decision design (2) and
hope that this might be applied in pharmacoepidemiology, it
does not solve the problems we raise.
What are the rest of us supposed to do? Should we tell so-
ciety, “Sorry, we can’t give you answers, or even evidence,
about major scientiﬁc issues because of ‘left truncation’?”
Should we throw out all knowledge on the adverse effects of
drugs on the basis of periods of use (oral contraceptives, non-
steroidal antiinﬂammatory drugs), even if it is clear that the
adverse effect occurs only during use and is unlikely to be
modiﬁed by time since ﬁrst use?
Whether a study is based on incident or prevalent expo-
sures, it is important to document this and to carefully assess
the likely biases. What we have is a choice between different
types of pragmatism: Which type works best depends on the
hypothesis under study and the populations available to
study it. What we need is problem-based methods rather than
theory that tautologically infers that some study designs are
inherently and always better than others.
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